I’d highly recommend reading “The Real Struggle In Iran,” George Friedman’s analysis the recent events in Iran. I have no way of knowing if Friedman’s analysis is accurate or not; but it seems a good deal more plausible to me than the narrative I’ve seen from much of the major media.
When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week, Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold things together by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by five days.
The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.
The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.
The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges — and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting.
Friedman argues that in terms of foreign policy, there is likely to be no difference to the US, no matter which faction comes out on top.
We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran’s ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform for bargaining without triggering Iran’s destruction, a task at which it has proved sure-footed.
In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon. Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible to destabilize Iraq — bogging down U.S. forces there — while simultaneously using Hezbollah’s global reach to carry out terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today’s al Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group’s ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, is substantial.
We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West. Those would have to include guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of this bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.
I’d recommend reading the whole thing, as well as this earlier piece by Friedman.
Thanks for posting this, Amp. I have been wanting to write more about Iran, but just haven’t had the time. I will have to go read the entire piece when I have a chance, but this makes a lot of sense to me and jives with the understanding I have had from the reading I’ve been doing, though I do think we should not underestimate the possibility–which might be slim, but I think it’s there–that the Islamic Republic’s violent response to the rallies, including murder and torture, has changed the equation in terms of even the way Mousavi sees things. That there is a power struggle going on within the regime, yes. That Ahmadinejad sees himself as somehow protecting the original purity of the revolution, yes. (And Khamenei’s son is deeply involved in trying to keep Ahamdinejad afloat.) That Mousavi and Khatami and Karroubi and company are not looking to transform Iran into a US style democracy, yes. (But then neither were the people in the street who participated in the original rallies. They also were not calling for regime change.) But that the government’s response would leave the reformist position, as well as the position of the people in the street, completely unchanged, I find hard to believe. Whether that change will make any significant difference in what happens next, however, remains to be seen.
Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution.
This strikes me as a little too generous. The later rhetoric that what we’re seeing is two factions of the establishment fighting against each other strikes me a significantly more accurate. Ahmadinejad has plenty of allies in “establishment” positions (particularly the IRC, and of course Khamenei), and he’s trying to oust another well-entrenched element of the regime establishment (represented more by Rafsanjani than Mousavi).
That being said, social movements aren’t static. Mousavi is not a liberal reformer — liberal reformers don’t get approved to run in Iranian elections. But liberal elements have certainly found themselves able to coalesce around Mousavi and assert claims and flex some political muscle in a way they haven’t been able to in the past. That this started as an internal battle doesn’t mean it will end as one. Iranian movements well beyond the typical establishment figures have invested some serious stakes in this pot, and the outcome of this conflict will have a major effect on their future viability and credibility.
Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks.
Er, no. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would permanently immunize it against attack.
There’s no actual evidence of election fraud in Iran. Such claims and counter-claims have been compiled at IranAffairs.com–go see for yourself
Mousavi was vetted and cleared to run for office because he’s a regime insider — and yet some people think he presented such a large threat to the regime that they had to resort to massive election fraud to keep him out office? Use your brains.
hass: I would say, simply this: It is possible, assuming for the moment that there was fraud–and I am not entirely persuaded by the counter-arguments against fraud–that the need for fraud had a lot more to do with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei–and Khamenei’s son–wanting to consolidate power, than with any ostensible threat that Mousavi might have posed. There is a video clip on the web–I wish I could find it easily right now (I will try to do so later)–of Ahmadinejad asking a group of clerics for permission to turn Iran from an Islamic Republic into, basically, an Islamic dictatorship in which even the managed democracy that now exists there would cease to exist. In other words, the idea that this is about liberal reformists versus the regime may not be the correct lens through which to view any of what’s going on in Iran, either the claims for fraud or the counterclaims, or even the protests in the street.
Richard — Khamenei’s son is not in control of institutions such as the Guardian Council which have vetting Mousavi, and have backed the election results. You’re violating the law of Occam’s Razor by coming up with more convoluted reasons to explain something which is easily explainable (no fraud) without any actual support.
Hass: Check out these links, just for a few: Chicago Tribune, The Guardian, Los Angeles Times, The Christian Science Monitor.