From “Making Sense Of Libya,” and other Libya links

I’d really recommend reading the International Crisis Group’s briefing on Libya (or at least read the executive summary, which is only three pages long). (pdf link) It has a lot of interesting background to the current conflict.

Here’s a brief passage from the executive summary:

The prospect for Libya, but also North Africa as a whole, is increasingly ominous, unless some way can be found to induce the two sides in the armed conflict to negotiate a compromise allowing for an orderly transition to a post Qaddafi, post-Jamahiriya state that has legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people.

A political breakthrough is by far the best way out of the costly situation created by the military impasse. This will require a ceasefire, the deployment of a peacekeeping force to monitor and guarantee this under a UN mandate and the immediate opening of serious negotiations between regime and opposition representatives to secure agreement on a peaceful transition to a new, more legitimate political order. Such a breakthrough almost certainly necessitates involvement by a third party or third parties accepted by both sides. A joint political initiative by the Arab League and the African Union – the former viewed more favourably by the opposition, the latter preferred by the regime – is one possibility to lead to such an agreement. They could build on ongoing efforts by the African Union and the UN Special Envoy, Abdul Ilah Khatib. But no breakthrough can happen without the leadership of the revolt and NATO rethinking their current stance.

Their repeatedly proclaimed demand that “Qaddafi must go” systematically confuses two quite different objectives. To insist that, ultimately, he can have no role in the post-Jamahiriya political order is one thing, and almost certainly reflects the opinion of a majority of Libyans as well as of the outside world. But to insist that he must go now, as the precondition for any negotiation, including that of a ceasefire, is to render a ceasefire all but impossible and so to maximise the prospect of continued armed conflict. To insist that he both leave the country and face trial in the International Criminal Court is virtually to ensure that he will stay in Libya to the bitter end and go down fighting.

Only an immediate ceasefire is consistent with the purpose originally claimed for NATO’s intervention, that of protecting civilians. The argument that Qaddafi has failed to deliver a ceasefire ignores the fact that Security Council Resolution 1973 did not place responsibility for achieving a ceasefire exclusively on one side and that no cease fire can be sustained unless it is observed by both sides. The complaint that Qaddafi cannot be trusted is one that can be levelled at any number of leaders on one side or another of a civil war. The way to deal with the issue is to establish the political conditions – by mobilising through concerted diplomacy a strong international consensus in favour of an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and serious negotiations – that will increase the likelihood that he keeps to his undertakings.

Another passage, this time from the report itself, suggesting that western media has exaggerated Qaddafi’s brutalities. This passage was also quoted on FrumForum, in a post entitled Have Qaddafi’s Abuses Been Exaggerated?; FrumForum also cited reports from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch.

I realize, of course, that Qaddafi has beyond any doubt been brutal and violent. But I do think it matters, when asking if the NATO intervention was justified, to know whether or not claims of impending genocide or large-scale massacres were true.

At the same time, much Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very one-sided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no real security challenge.

This version would appear to ignore evidence that the protest movement exhibited a violent aspect from very early on. While there is no doubt that many and quite probably a large majority of the people mobilised in the early demonstrations were indeed intent on demonstrating peacefully, there is also evidence that, as the regime claimed, the demonstrations were infiltrated by violent elements.

Likewise, there are grounds for questioning the more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators, let alone engaging in anything remotely warranting use of the term “genocide”.

That said, the repression was real enough, and its brutality shocked even Libyans.

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Josh Rogin argues that last week’s failed House resolution to defund operations in Libya has been widely misunderstood, and was in fact a stealth authorization of our involvement in Libya.

The vote failed 180-238 – but, in fact, there were more than enough lawmakers to pass the measure. Of the 149 Democrats who stuck with the president, up to 70 of them are totally opposed to the Libya intervention and want to see it completely defunded as soon as possible. They voted “no” on the Rooney’s bill because they thought it was too weak, did not cut off all funds, and implicitly authorized the intervention. These 70 Democrats make up the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), the largest caucus within the House Democratic Caucus, whose leadership includes Reps. Mike Honda (D-CA), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) and Raul Grijalva (D-AZ).

“Members of Congress voted no because the bill provided funding and legal authority for everything we’re currently doing. It was back door authorization. Members didn’t support authorizing what we’re doing now in Libya,” Michael Shank, Honda’s spokesman, told The Cable. “The majority of the CPC voted no on the Rooney vote because of this.” In other words, if the GOP had put forth a stronger anti-Libya resolution, the progressive Democrats would have joined them and it would have passed. Despite what Clinton or other administration officials may say, the bill’s failure cannot be seen as an endorsement of the Libya war.

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Hilary Clinton should be ashamed of herself for this quote:

“But the bottom line is, whose side are you on? Are you on Qadhafi’s side or are you on the side of the aspirations of the Libyan people and the international coalition that has been created to support them? For the Obama Administration, the answer to that question is very easy.”

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And finally, two ironically juxtiposed quotes (via Glenn Greenwald):

“Broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake” — President Barack Obama, March 28, 2011

“The top U.S. admiral involved in the Libya war admitted to a U.S. congressman that NATO forces are trying to kill Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. The same admiral also said he anticipated the need for ground troops in Libya after Qaddafi falls.” — Josh Rogin, Foreign Policy, yesterday.